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Abstract 
Since the landmark case Citizens United v. FEC (2010), the topic of money in politics has 
been highly salient. While Justice Kennedy’s holding in it is firmly against campaign finance 
regulation, he appears to leave the door open to disclosure laws. While campaign finance 
reform has been widely discussed from legal and policy standpoints, little research has been 
conducted on the impact that these disclosure laws have on voters. This study focuses on the 
potential impact that a disclosure system can have on how voters measure a candidate’s 
trustworthiness. By using a random sample of potential voters in Columbus, Ohio and Irvine, CA, 
I conducted an experimental survey. First, respondents were asked a timed questionnaire to 
gauge their political knowledge. Subsequently, respondents watched an ad advocating for a 
fictional city council candidate. Respondents were then randomly assigned to one of three 
groups in which they were told that the ad was paid for by “Americans for Liberal Action”, 
“Americans for Conservative Action”, or “Americans for Action”. Respondents were then asked 
questions about how they perceived the candidate, and the likelihood of voting for him. Finally, 
respondents were asked specific demographic questions. I hypothesize that potential voters can 
and do draw political cues when disclosed the name of an advocacy organization that supports 
a candidate. Specifically, when the advocacy organization gives an ideological cue that is similar 
to the beliefs the potential voter, he or she will be likelier to support the candidate than if they 
are not given that cue, or if they are given a cue that contradicts their beliefs. I find that across 
subgroups, respondents are in fact more likely to vote for the candidate when he is supported by 
the non-ideological cue. 
Introduction 
On October 14, 2015, CNN hosted the first Democratic Presidential Debate. Within their 
opening remarks, Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and former Senator Jim Webb (D-VA) directly 
addressed the issue of excessive money within the political spectrum. Senator Webb 
commented, “People are disgusted with the way that money has corrupted our political 
process, intimidating incumbents and empowering Wall Street every day, the turnstile 
government that we see, and also the power of the financial sector in both parties”. Similarly, 
Senator Sanders stated, “As a result of this disastrous Citizens United Supreme Court decision, 
our campaign finance system is corrupt and is undermining American democracy. Millionaires 
and billionaires are pouring unbelievable sums of money into the political process in order to 
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fund super PACs and to elect candidates who represent their interests, not the interests of 
working people.”1 
On the other side of the political spectrum, now President Donald Trump also 
commented on excessive money within the political spectrum. Trump declared “I will tell you 
that our system is broken. I gave to many people. Before this, before two months ago, I was a 
businessman. I give to everybody. When they call, I give. And you know what? When I need 
something from them, two years later, three years later, I call them. They are there for me. And 
that's a broken system.”2 
As exemplified by these quotes, the salience of the issue of money in politics has 
increased. Truly, since the days of Watergate, people have held a closer eye on the effect that 
money plays on the political process. While the issue went to the back of many voters’ minds in 
the years afterwards, it was brought back after the Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission case in 2010. A June 2015 New York Times/ CBS News Poll showed that 66% of 
people thought that “the wealthy have more of a chance to influence the elections process 
than other Americans”.34 Similar polls5 have shown the salience of this issue- many on both the 
left and the right of the American spectrum seem to agree that there is an exorbitant amount 
                                                          
1 "The CNN Democratic Debate Transcript, Annotated." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 13 Oct. 2015. 
Web. 02 Nov. 2015. 
2 "Prokop, Andrew.”Donald Trump Made One Shockingly Insightful Comment during the First GOP Debate." Vox. 
Vox Media, 06 Aug. 2015. Web. 10 Dec. 2015. <http://www.vox.com/2015/8/6/9114565/donald-trump-debate-
money>. 
3 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/02/us/politics/money-in-politics-poll.html?_r=0  
4 While Democrats were more likely than Republicans to say yes to the above statement, a majority of respondents 
in both parties agreed on the above statement. 
5 https://mayday.us/new-presidential-
poll/?&utm_source=mayday&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20150930  
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of money within the political system. They are right- campaign committee spending, outside 
expenditures, and dark money spending have all greatly increased. 
History of US Campaign Finance Laws 
 To truly get a sense of the issues and intricacies behind the campaign finance system of 
the United States, we must first look at its history. The foundation of campaign finance 
regulations in this country predates even thought of a revolution from Great Britain as a 
possible or practical option. After George Washington lost his first election to the Virginia 
House of Burgesses in 1755, he edited his strategy by entertaining voters in a polling booth 
nearby. Washington provided “a barrel of punch, 35 gal. of wine, 43 gal. of strong cider and 
dinner for his friends”, which cost him about 39 pounds and 6 shillings.6 Washington’s tactic 
worked, and he was easily elected to the Virginia House. However, his colleagues in the new 
legislature quickly passed a law preventing candidates from giving prospective voters "money, 
meat, drink, entertainment or provision or … any present, gift, reward or entertainment etc. in 
order to be elected.” Thus, campaign finance laws and regulation began even before our 
country was founded. Although the laws enacted by the Burgesses were by no means 
sweeping, monumental, or even necessarily relevant today; they are highly symbolic of the 
culture and thought process of the founding fathers. 
While campaign finance reform has had a complicated history since Washington’s 
encounter with the Burgesses, the modern age of campaign finance regulation did not begin 
until after Nixon’s Watergate scandal in 1972. In 1974, Congress passed multiple Amendments 
                                                          
6 Campaign Cash Degrades Discussion of Issues- AARP Bulletin: http://www.aarp.org/politics-society/government-
elections/info-04-2012/campaign-cash-key-issues.html 
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to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, legislation constructed before the momentous 
Watergate scandal in 1972. These amendments included limits on expenditures by candidates, 
limits on contributions to candidates, limits on independent expenditures, a creation of a 
Federal Election Commission (FEC), direct appointment of FEC commissioners, and others. 
However, in 1976, the Court struck down many of these in the holding of Buckley v. Valeo 
(1976) including the limits on expenditures by candidates who did not accept public funding, 
the limits on independent expenditures, and the shared appointment system which Congress 
and the President appointed FEC commissioners (the court found this in violation of separation 
of powers). These provisions were stuck down mainly upon First Amendment violations, and 
was described as the court as follows: 
"The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most 
fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the 
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government 
established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to 
such political expression in order 'to assure (the) unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”78 
From then until the early 2000s, a few key events occurred. In 1990, the United States 
Supreme Court held in a 6-3 decision that the Michigan Campaign Finance Act was not a 
                                                          
7 BUCKLEY v. VALEO 424 U.S. 1 (1976)U.S. Supreme Court Decided January 30, 1976 
8 In my opinion, it is important to note the importance of Buckley. It is this case that truly began the “special 
words” doctrine. For instance, corporations and unions, both which had strong previous bans, were allowed to still 
influence elections- they simply could not use the word “elect”. Future magic words laws with superPACs and 501 
(c)s would be enacted and have rampant effect after 2007 with FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc, where 
SuperPACs had the power to influence elections, so long they didn’t use the words “vote for”, ”elect”, “support”, 
“cast your ballot for”, “Smith for Congress”,  “vote against”, “defeat”, “reject” or so on.  
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violation of the First Amendment under Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. In the 
holding, Justice Thurgood Marshal stated, “This restriction serves the compelling state interest 
of eliminating the coercive effects of the political marketplace of great amounts of wealth that 
are accountable to the income of the corporate report.”9 The act had prohibited corporations 
from using “general treasury funds for, inter alia, independent expenditures in connection with 
state candidate elections”.10 Furthermore, in 1992, President George H.W. Bush vetoed the 
Senate Elections Ethics Act of 1991, which, among other things, would have amended the FECA 
to include a provision that would provide partial public financing for congressional candidates. 
In his veto statement, President Bush claimed that “Our nation needs campaign finance laws 
that place the interests of individual citizens and political parties above special interests and 
that provide a level playing field between challengers and incumbents. What we do not need is 
a taxpayer-financed incumbent protection plan.”11 
However, in 2002, a rather monumental change happened. The McCain-Feingold 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) was passed. While it was eventually signed into law, 
President George W. Bush expressed multiple concerns upon signing12, including a concern for 
a restriction of individual freedom, as well as lack of strength on protection for union members 
and shareholders. BCRA created a limit on the increased role of “soft money”, or non-FEC 
regulated money. After the 1979 FECA amendments, the FEC allowed the use of soft money for 
                                                          
9 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved December 6, 2015, from 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1569 
10 "Austin V. Michigan Chamber of Commerce." Legal Information Institute. Cornell Law School, n.d. Web. 06 Dec. 
2015. <https://www.law.cornell.edu/background/campaign_finance/88-1569.html>. 
11 "Bush Rejects Campaign Finance Legislation." CQ Almanac, n.d. Web. 6 Dec. 2015. 
<https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal92-1106995#65>. 
12 "George W. Bush: Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64503 
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“party building activity”. As this term was never explicitly defined under Buckley, ads could be 
run for the purpose of educating voters- known as issue advocacy ads. So long as any 
organization did not state one of the eight magic words- “vote for”, “elect”, “support”, “’Smith’ 
for Congress”, “vote against”, “defeat”, or “reject”, the ad did not have to be subject to a hard 
money regulation. Soft money was a useful tool for both parties and candidates to bypass the 
previous FECA limitations on elections contributions. BCRA’s attempt to close this loophole was 
not perfect, however; 501(c) organizations (tax exempt non-profits) and 527 organizations 
(Super PACs/Political Interest Groups) were exempt from any sort of soft money ban. However, 
while 527s were not given any sort of spending limits, they were required to register with the 
IRS and file “’periodic’ reports of contributions and expenditures. Those committees that raised 
or spent $50,000 a year (or expect to) are required to use the IRS' electronic filing system, while 
other committees can file on paper.”13 
BCRA’s regulatory power, however, would not remain unchecked for long. In 2003, the 
California Democratic Party, National Rifle Association, American Civil Liberties Union, and 
individuals such as Senator Mitch McConnell filed a joint lawsuit against the Federal Election 
Commission, arguing that the regulations enacted were unconstitutional and were a violation of 
the First Amendment. In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003), the court specifically 
looked at the soft money ban as a possible violation of the 1st Amendment. However, in a 5-4 
decision, the Court upheld most provisions of BCRA, stating that since the regulation was on 
soft money, which had less of a statement of “political values”, the government had a 
                                                          
13 "527s - Frequently Asked Questions." Center for Public Integrity. N.p., 21 Nov. 2005. Web. 02 Nov. 2015. 
<http://www.publicintegrity.org/2005/11/21/5541/527s-frequently-asked-questions#5>. 
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legitimate interest in regulating it as a form of possible corruption. In the majority opinion, 
Justice O’Connor and Stevens wrote that “money, like water, will always find an outlet”. 14  
 While McConnell v. FEC did uphold most of BCRA, the case represents an important 
shift in the courts mentality- they were once again likely to accept hearing cases about 
campaign finance laws. In 2006, a Vermont campaign finance law that placed a cap on financial 
donations made to individuals was struck down as a violation of the first amendment.  In 
Randal v. Sorrell, the Supreme Court determined that Vermont’s campaign contribution limits 
of 200/400 dollars were unconstitutionally low, claiming that the limits were “disproportionate 
to the public purposes they were enacted to advance”. While the court acknowledged that 
some limits are constitutional, “danger signs”, such as the one in the Vermont Law, could 
hinder candidates from properly being able to campaign.15 While it dealt with a single state law, 
Randal is important as it was the first case that the Supreme Court has struck down a 
contribution limit as unconstitutionally low.  
Interestingly enough, opinion polls show that BCRA did not seem to improve public trust 
and attitudes about money in politics. In fact, when Americans were asked by Gallup Poll about 
the state of the nation’s campaign finance laws, dissatisfaction actually slightly rose after BCRA 
was signed. Two reasons explain this slight bump in dissatisfaction. One was that despite its 
intent and arguably good faith effort, BCRA did not end impact of soft money- it simply diverted 
money to 527 (tax exempt groups) as well as 501(c) (interest groups which do not have to 
                                                          
14 McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. N.p., n.d. Web. 02 Nov. 2015. <http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-
2009/2003/2003_02_1674>. 
15 Randall v. Sorrell <http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_04_1528> 
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disclose their donors so long as federal campaign activity is not their main purpose). The fact 
that campaign cues towards voters did not decrease post-BCRA, such as campaign 
advertisements and other electioneering materials, would explain why there was not sudden 
satisfaction in the system. Additionally, LaRaja notes that, “Americans do not pay attention to 
the workings of the campaign finance system, and they certainly cannot distinguish between 
scandals involving soft money versus bundlers”. 16 This is a vital point- although most Americans 
polled could tell that something was ‘wrong’ with the system, many could not differentiate 
between the intricacies of campaign finance regulations. 
 
The most controversial campaign finance reform case of our time happened in 2010. By 
early 2008, the conservative non-profit organization Citizens United, which stated that its 
                                                          
16 LaRaja, Raymond J “From Bad to Worse,” The Forum 6 (2008): Issue 1, Article 2 
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mission was to “reassert the traditional American values of limited government, freedom of 
enterprise, strong families, and national sovereignty and security”17,  produced a movie highly 
critical of then Senator Hillary Clinton. Known as Hillary: The Movie, it was scheduled to be 
offered as video-on-demand on Direct TV right before many of the Democratic primary 
elections in January 2008. As a preventive measure, Citizens United then filed a lawsuit arguing 
that the “ban on corporate electioneering communications and the laws disclosure and 
disclaimer requirements was unconstitutional as applied to Hillary: The Movie and its three 
ads”. In Citizens United v. FEC (2010), the Supreme Court held that independent expenditures 
by corporation’s and labor union’s treasury PACs were protected by the First Amendment. This 
invalidated the various provisions of BCRA that restricted independent expenditures within the 
last 20 days of an election. A few months later, federal judges applied the case to 
Speechnow.org v. FEC, deciding that unlimited independent expenditures were valid. Both 
Speechnow and Citizens United opened the door for the creation of superPACs. 
Citizen United had immediate pushback. Many powerful government officials have 
openly criticized the Supreme Court decision. House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi stated that 
the decision “represents a step backward for the American people and our nation’s political 
process.” Senator John McCain (R-AZ), coauthor of BCRA, claimed that it was “the most 
misguided, naïve, uninformed, egregious decision of the United States Supreme Court, I think, 
in the twenty-first century.”18 Senator John Kerry went a step further, stating “I think we need a 
constitutional amendment to make it clear once and for all that corporations do not have the 
                                                          
17 Coyle, Marcia. The Roberts Court: The Struggle for the Constitution. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print. 
18 Id. at 16 
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same free speech rights as individuals.”19 Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has 
openly stated “"If there was one decision I would overrule," Ginsburg told The New Republic, it 
would be Citizens United….I think the notion that we have all the democracy that money can 
buy strays so far from what our democracy is supposed to be"20 
Although the current era of Campaign Finance is predominantly characterized by the 
Citizens United case, one important case has also shaped the lens at which to look at the 
system- McCutcheon v. FEC (2014). McCutcheon held that two year aggregate campaign 
contribution limits were unconstitutional under the First Amendment.21 Prior to this decision, 
individuals were prohibited from donating more than $48,600 combined to all federal 
candidates, and prohibited from donating more than $74,600 combined to all parties and 
federal candidates. However, the Supreme Court decided to uphold the “base” contribution 
limits, meaning that the maximum one individual can donate to a single candidate is still $2,600  
(plus a cost of living adjustment) per single election.22 While the majority did keep this provision 
in place, Justice Clarence Thomas’ concurrence noted that he believed that Buckley v. Valeo 
should be overturned, and that BCRA and all campaign contribution limits should be subject to 
stricter scrutiny. This may foreshadow a future direction that some justices on the court may 
want to approach future campaign finance regulation and limits.  For the time being, it appears 
that the Supreme Court has slowed down on hearing cases about campaign finance. The Court 
                                                          
19 "Quotes by Members of Congress on Citizens United." PFAW. <http://www.pfaw.org/issues/fair-and-just-
courts/quotes-members-of-congress-citizens-united>. 
20 Alman, Ashley. "Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Citizens United Was The Current Supreme Court's Worst Ruling." The 
Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 28 Sept. 2014. Web. 02 Nov. 2015. 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/28/ruth-bader-ginsburg-citizens-united_n_5897760.html>. 
21 McCutcheon v. FEC https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-536  
22 http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml  
 12 
 
denied hearing Iowa Right to Life Committee v. Tooker, a case which would have looked at state 
bans on corporate contributions.23  
Thus, campaign finance regulations since the passage of the FECA has drastically 
changed. However, there are a couple of key takeaways from examining the modern history of 
campaign finance laws. For one, the practical options that reformers have are very clearly 
different from what they had even just ten years ago. Many reformers are shifting away from 
advocating for caps on contribution limits as well as caps on individual spending (aside from 
those who push for the quixotic attempt at amending the Constitution), as the Supreme Court 
very clearly seems to be taking a hard line against it. Additionally, while “matching fund” 
programs appear to be another practical option for reformers, even those programs appear to 
be under attack by the court. In Arizona Free Enterprise Fund et al. v Bennett et al. (2011), the 
Court struck down Arizona’s system of providing additional funding to publicly funded 
candidates when they faced opponents or opposition groups with big money.24 While 
reformers can take solace that the Court stated “we do not today call into question the wisdom 
of public financing as a means of funding political candidacy”, effective public financing systems 
like the one in Arizona have definitely been weakened by the holding of this case. However, 
although the court ended up striking down parts of BCRA and the FECA in Citizens United, it is 
important to note that the Court ultimately left the door open to disclosure. Ironically, Citizens 
United strengthened the legality for Congress to pass effective disclosure laws. In his opinion, 
                                                          
23 "Search - Supreme Court of the United States." Supreme Court of the United States. N.p., n.d. Web. 02 Nov. 
2015. <http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=%2Fdocketfiles%2F13-407.htm>. 
24 ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB’S FREEDOM CLUB PAC ET AL. v. BENNETT, SECRETARY OF STATE OF ARIZONA, 
ET AL. Supreme Court. 27 June 2011. Print. 
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Justice Kennedy comments, “With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of 
expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold 
corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters. Shareholders 
can determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest 
in making profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are “‘in the pocket’ of so-called 
moneyed interests.”25 Thus, disclosure remains one of, if not the, strongest weapon that 
democratic reformers can potentially utilize today. 
Voter Behavior 
In Citizens United, it appears that the majority of the Supreme Court base part of their 
decision upon a rational-actor model of voting behavior, such as Popkin’s reasoning voter, 
where voters “use premises to make inferences from their observations of the world around 
them”. For instance, in Chief Justice Robert’s concurrence, he notes that “Legislatures remain 
free in their incorporation and tax laws to condition the types of activity in which corporations 
may engage, including electioneering activity, on specific disclosure requirements or on prior 
express approval by shareholders or members.” However, what the majority fails to account for 
is that there are other ways that citizens vote upon. Popkin discusses the idea of low-
information rationality, where voters combine “learning and information from past 
experiences, daily life, the media, and political campaigns”.26 This framework discusses that 
voting “is not like buying a television set” but is more like investing “in future benefits to be 
derived from the government”. Essentially, Kennedy alludes to the fact that voting is simply like 
                                                          
25 "Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n 558 U.S. ___ (2010)." Justia Law. N.p., n.d. Web. 02 Apr. 2016. 
26 Popkin, Samuel L. The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns. Chicago: U of 
Chicago, 2008. Print. 
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a rational economic decision, and donor disclosure can provide useful information, similar to 
reading a prospectus before investing in a mutual fund. 
Political scientists have long studied the way that voters identify and apply certain cues 
when they do not have enough information to make a fully calculated, “rational” decision. 
These cues can range from signaling to a specific political party (partisanship), signaling to a 
particular ideology, factors about one’s appearance (such as ethnicity or age), support or 
opposition from various groups, or likelihood of winning (viability). Simply put, these cues can 
act as heuristics, or mental shortcuts and rules, which assist voters in making their decisions on 
complicated issues, or on issues which they may not have complete knowledge about. 
Heuristics are examples of “system 1” processes, which “operate automatically and quickly, 
with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control”. Alternatively, “system 2” processes 
require “attention to effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex 
computations. The operations of system 2 are often associated with the subjective experience 
of agency, choice, and concentration”. 27 Both of these systems draw upon the idea that 
humans have a finite amount of cognitive capacity, or a limited amount of energy to spend on 
complicated mental tasks. If that energy becomes depleted, humans revert to using their 
“system 1” processes. Most researchers agree that this sort of dualistic thinking occurs when 
analyzing voting behavior. For instance, Lupia describes it as the difference between 
“encyclopedic” vs “information shortcuts”.28 Similarly, Rahn contrasts the two styles as 
                                                          
27 Kahneman, Daniel (2011-10-25). Thinking, Fast and Slow (p. 20). Macmillan. Print. 
28 Lupia, Arthur. “Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform 
Elections.” The American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 1, 1994, pp. 63–76., www.jstor.org/stable/2944882. 
 15 
 
heuristical and “theory-driven” vs “data-driven”.29 While whether heuristic use is beneficial or 
detrimental is debatable, most voters do utilize them in some way to assist with voting.  
Popkin also discusses the idea of voters “projecting” their beliefs on candidates. “When 
voters identify what parties are candidates, they are giving them the benefit of the doubt. 
When they assume that the positions they favor are the ones their party or candidate will take, 
or when they assume that their favorite candidates position is acceptable, they are projecting 
on the basis of past information much the same way that an investor in stocks projects future 
earnings from past corporate performance, or assumes that a company whose new president 
has a record of successes will improve under his leadership”.  
This idea of projection is tied to the idea of trust- when a shareholder is doubtful or 
does not trust a CEO’s leadership or judgement, he or she will likely move their money out of 
the company. This idea of trust has many different definitions- some define trust as “the degree 
to which people perceive that government is producing outcomes consistent with expectations” 
which emphasizes the term “perception”, for “people’s view of government is far different than 
its actual performance would predict”.30 Aday notes that, “when political trust is relatively high, 
people will be likely to see a federal role in helping minorities, the poor, and foreign nations, 
even though most will not actually benefit directly from such policies; when trust is relatively 
low, that support disappears”.31 Simply put, when things are going well, people will trust 
                                                          
29 Rahn, Wendy M. “The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing about Political Candidates.” 
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 37, no. 2, 1993, pp. 472–496., www.jstor.org/stable/2111381. 
30 Hetherington, Marc J. Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2005. Pp. 9-10 Print. 
31 Aday, Sean. "Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism." Public Opinion 
Quarterly. 69.2 (2005). Pp. 330 Print. 
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government actors. When things are going badly, people will not. A similar model includes 
Retrospective Voting, in which voters continuously evaluate the performance of current party 
with power, and use this evaluation of past performance in order effectively make an 
evaluation of a future performance.32 This model can simply be summed up by the fact “citizens 
are not fools” and that citizens “pass judgements on the leaders, not policies”. Theoretically, 
political disclosure reports can change how much or how little a voter trusts or makes a 
judgement upon a politician. If disclosure information is given to the voter that shows 
fundraising activity from sources that are contrary to a voter’s beliefs, this can decrease the 
voters trust in the candidate. Conversely, if they receive information that shows fundraising 
activity from sources that are synonymous with the voter’s beliefs, this can increase the voter’s 
trust in the candidate. 
Additionally, Levi and Stoker’s provide a definition for trust that appears to be all-
encompassing. 
 “Although trust is a contested term, there appears to be some minimal consensus 
about its meaning. Trust is relational; it involves an individual making herself vulnerable 
to another individual, group, or institution that has the capacity to do her harm or to 
betray her. Trust is seldom unconditional; it is given to specific individuals or institutions 
over specific domains. For instance, citizens may entrust their lives to their government 
during wartime but not trust the bureaucracies that expend funds during 
peacetime…Trust judgments are expected to inspire courses of action.”33 
This definition gives a good overview of what trust is accepted to be. It is typically a 
concept that humans perceive to be relative (you can trust to a certain degree), a concept that 
                                                          
32 Fiorina, Morris P. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale UP, 1981. Print. 
33 Levi, Margaret, and Laura Stoker. "POLITICAL TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS." Annual Review of Political 
Science 3 (2000): pp. 476. Web. 
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involves vulnerability (you are potentially sacrificing security when trusting), and a concept that 
is relational (trust being an integral factor of the relationship). 
Broadly speaking, the notion of an endorsement heuristic applies to many situations in 
everyday life. For instance, while the clear majority of people agree the earth revolves around 
the sun, few know the exact astronomical calculations that lead to that conclusion. While the 
clear majority of people agree upon the fact that smoking causes cancer, fewer can articulate 
the specific damage that the smoke does to cells, how a cancer develops, and so on. Most of 
the knowledge that we “know” is in fact simply a mental bookmark or reference point to an 
expert’s knowledge. Sloman discusses that “knowing that experts understand a phenomenon 
gives individuals the sense that they understand it better themselves, but only if they believe 
they have access to the experts’ explanation … [People] take cognitive credit for other people’s 
knowledge. People fail to draw a sharp boundary between the knowledge they possess and the 
knowledge to which they have access in their community”.34 One’s trusting of an expert in this 
case serves as a reference point that he or she uses to make future decisions.  
Some of these cues play a greater role in vote choice than others. For example, there is 
evidence that topics that are even considered as “non-attitudes” can be influenced greatly by partisan 
cues. In February 1995, Richard Morin revisited the classic experiment of the “1975 Public Affair Act” (a 
fictional piece of legislation in order to test non-attitudes) by adding the partisan cues that either 
“President Clinton” or “Republicans” supported repealing the act. Essentially, “once activated, 
partisanship clearly guided how respondents answered… When told it was President Clinton’s idea, self-
                                                          
34 Sloman, Steven A., and Nathaniel Rabb. "Your Understanding Is My Understanding." Psychological Science 27.11 
(2016): 1451-460. Web. 
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identified Democrats tended to favor repealing the Public Affairs Act, whereas Republicans were more 
likely to oppose its repeal. But if they heard it was a proposal by the GOP in Congress, Republicans 
overwhelmingly favored getting rid of it, whereas Democrats opposed the idea by a margin of more than 
three to one…. Psychologically, the gist of the question had become: If they’re for it, I’m against it”. As 
suspected, when given the partisan cue, the responses of “Don’t Know” was much smaller than when 
those cues were not given.”35 A similar experiment done by Rahn notes that when fictional candidates 
emphasized past party heroes, such as Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, voters preferred 
to utilize heuristic-based processing, simply “using the label rather than policy attributes in drawing 
inferences”.36 Strikingly, even when there was incongruence between the party and the issue, voters 
relied this heuristic based thinking. 
 
Similar research by Grant and Rudolph shows, that when people are affiliated with, or 
simply like, a certain group, they believe that restrictions should not be placed on that group’s 
spending. However, when there is no affiliation to a group, or there is dislike, regulations are 
                                                          
35 Bishop, George F. 2005. The Illusion of Public Opinion : Fact and Artifact in American Public Opinion Polls. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
36 Id at 32. 
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deemed acceptable. (Grant and Rudolph, 2003). Additional findings include that “… 
considerations of free speech were weighted more heavily in citizens’ decisional calculus than 
concerns about group’s undue influence. After evaluating a disliked group, however, beliefs 
about groups’ rights were sacrificed in concerns about groups’ influence” (465). This is 
intriguing as “bias in political judgements [are] apparently not [only] confined to narrow and 
emotional issues… bias surfaces even in decisions … like whether to reform the campaign 
finance system”.37 
In the absence of partisan cues and the ability to evaluate retrospectively, Lupia found 
that voters were still able to use information shortcuts effectively to make judgements about 
five proposed policies towards auto-insurance reform in 1988. In campaigning, the insurance 
industry spent roughly $65 million on campaigning, compared to $15 million by Trial Lawyers, 
and less than $2 million by consumer advocates. Thus, the insurance industry had the greatest 
amount of exposure on urging voters. Lupia notes that “The relationship between these three 
groups (high knowledge with knowledge of insurance industry preference, low knowledge with 
knowledge of insurance industry preferences, and low knowledge without knowledge of 
insurance industry preferences) strongly supports the assertion that knowledge of the 
insurance industry’s preference provided an effective shortcut for voters whose (encyclopedic) 
knowledge of proposition content was low”.38 Essentially, those who had the knowledge on 
which reforms the insurance industry was against (Proposition 103) seemed to overwhelmingly 
vote for it, even if they didn’t have the full “encyclopedic knowledge” on what the Proposition 
                                                          
37 Grant, J. Tobin, and Thomas J. Rudolph. "Value Conflict, Group Affect, and the Issue of Campaign Finance." Am J 
Political Science American Journal of Political Science 47.3 (2003): 453-69. Web. 
38 Id. at 31 
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stood for. Voters once again based their decisions on the idea “if they’re for it, I must be against 
it”. Even in these conditions where voters do not have specific cues on how their party would 
vote, or how the policy has fared in the past, voters are still able to draw upon cues based upon 
associations of the policy.   
While partisan cues appear to very clearly bolster support for policies and candidates 
when that information is disclosed, I wonder if ideology reacts the same way. Whether or not 
ideology in and of itself exists has been a debate amongst political scientists since the 1950s. 
Philip Converse’s work on political ideology demonstrated that citizens did not see the world 
through ideological lenses. To clarify, a political ideology can be defined as “an interrelated set 
of attitudes and values about the proper role of society”.39 In Converse’s words, “The more 
impoverished [a citizen’s] understanding of the term [conservative or liberal] the less the term 
conveys. In the limiting case- if he does not know at all what the term means- it conveys no 
information at all”. In his study, Converse characterized voters into five groups. As seen below, 
ideologues and near-ideologues only made up 11.5% of the electorate. In another study, 
Converse noted that “nearly 40 percent of the respondents either did not recognize these 
terms or were unable to attach any meaning to these terms”.40 
 
                                                          
39 Tedin, Kent “Political Ideology and the Vote,” Research in Micropolitics 2 (1987):65 
40 Clawson, Rosalee A., and Zoe M. Oxley. Public Opinion: Democratic Ideals, Democratic Practice. Washington, 
D.C.: CQ, 2017. Print. 
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However, Converse’s conclusions are not necessarily completely true today. For one, 
Converse’s survey methodology may not have been specific enough to measure the raw 
complexity of political thinking. An ethnographic or an interview approach may possibly have 
provided a better approach at gauging how respondents derived their decisions, as these would 
allow respondents to identify ideologically in their own words. Finally, “2012 saw the lowest 
proportion of the electorate [23%] indicating that they were not able to identify their ideology 
since the ANES began asking this question”. This suggests that although voters in the 1950s may 
not have viewed the world through ideological lenses, ideology certainly has a greater impact 
on voting decisions today. 
A widely accepted model of voting suggests that a voter is made by ones strength of 
partisanship along with the impact of “short term forces”, which can include a candidates 
image, the party’s current image, and relevant issues. However, this traditional model does not 
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incorporate the potential for disclosure. This research leads me to the question: does disclosure 
impact a voter’s decision? And if it does, does ideology still play a major role? 
Methodology 
 
Thus, to test the effects of extremely clear disclosure on the vote process, I designed a 
survey-experiment. Respondents were recruited via two lists of registered voters, and screened 
for voter registration and the ability to see and listen to videos on their device. Participants 
were then asked a series of political knowledge questions, to both prime them into thinking 
about their own political attitudes and to gauge their general political knowledge. After, 
participants watched a short, fictional political commercial about a candidate named James 
Scott, who was running for city council. They were then given a possibility of one of three 
treatments, the information that the ad that they just watched was paid for by an organization 
known as “Americans for Liberal Action”, “Americans for Conservative Action”, or “Americans 
for Action”. Participants were asked to describe what they thought of the candidate, how 
competent he was, how trustworthy he was, and how they would rate him on a feeling 
thermometer from 0-100. Participants were then asked again who paid for the ad, and would 
be reminded who the sponsor was if they were wrong. Finally, participants were asked how 
likely they would be to vote for James Scott and some basic demographic questions. 
Respondents were randomly selected from two email lists, one of voters in Columbus, 
Ohio, and one of voters in Orange County, CA. Respondents were then contacted using 
Qualtrics, and requested to take part in a general study about voter behavior. After the initial 
invite, respondents who had not completed the survey were issued another reminder email a 
 23 
 
week after the initial invite. The survey fielded from January 27, 2017 to February 8, 2017. 100 
respondents participated from the Columbus sample, while 247 respondents participated from 
the Orange County sample, yielding a total n of 347 complete responses.  
Participants were first asked whether they were registered to vote; anyone who 
answered no to this was screened out. While this may seem odd, the idea behind the 
experiment was to see the impact of disclosure upon voters, so if someone had not even 
registered to vote, it is unlikely that he or she would be participating at all within the political 
process. Participants were then screened for whether they could watch and listen to an 
embedded video, as this would-be part of the treatment process later. Those who were unable 
to see or hear the video were also terminated.  
Participants were then asked various topical political questions. The purpose of asking 
theses was twofold. The first was so that participants would be primed into thinking about 
political issues, and so that at some level, they would be thinking about their personal political 
attitudes. The second was to see if there was a relationship between a participants “knowledge 
score” and his or her reaction to the treatment imposed. I expected to see high levels of 
political knowledge, as it is likely that this would be a politically motivated sample, or that one 
would already have a moderate to high interest in politics if they were taking the survey. 
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Table 1: Political Knowledge Text  
Qualtrics 
Question ID# Question Text Correct Answer 
N 
correct 
7 Who is the current Speaker of the House? Paul Ryan 302 
9 
According to the Constitution, how many Senators 
are allocated to each state? 2 
309 
11 
Which political party -- the Democratic or 
Republican -- currently has the most members in 
the U.S. House of Representatives? Republican 
338 
13 
Which of these parties in the United States is 
typically considered to be more Conservative? Republican 
341 
15 How many years are in a US Senator's term? 6 206 
 
The participant was then asked to watch a 45 second fictional political commercial. The 
Columbus and the Orange County commercials were extremely similar. The only key difference 
that existed between them was that the Columbus commercial made the references that James 
Scott was running for Columbus City Council, while the Orange County commercial simply 
referenced Scott was running for City Council. Additionally, as the commercial was shot in 
Columbus, there were potential cues that Columbus based participants could pick up on. 
Participants were then given the respective treatment that Qualtrics had randomly 
assigned them in the beginning of the survey. Qualtrics randomly and equally placed 
participants in three different groups, one being the ‘liberal’ treatment, one being the 
‘conservative’ treatment, and one being a ‘control’.  
Table 2: Treatment Text 
Qualtrics 
Question ID# 
Treatment n Text 
50 Conservative 115 
The advertisement you just saw was paid for by an 
organization known as Americans for Conservative Action. 
51 Liberal 113 
The advertisement you just saw was paid for by an 
organization known as Americans for Liberal Action. 
52 Control 119 
The advertisement you just saw was paid for by an 
organization known as Americans for Action. 
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They were then asked to describe what they thought of the candidate in an open-ended 
question, along with how competent or trustworthy they thought the candidate was. They 
were also asked to rate the candidate on a scale from 0-100. At that point, the participant 
would be reminded once again who sponsored the advertisement. This was done to specifically 
emphasize the impact that disclosure would have. Finally, the participant was asked how they 
would vote for Scott.  
Table 3: Dependent Variables  
Qualtrics 
Question ID# Question Text Scale Points Means 
20 
How competent did you think that James 
Scott was for the position he was running 
for? 
1. Extremely 
competent 
2. Fairly competent 
3. Not very competent 
4. Not at all competent 
2.4315476 
21 
How trustworthy did you feel that James 
Scott was? 
1. Extremely 
trustworthy 
2. Fairly trustworthy 
3. Not very trustworthy 
4. Not at all 
trustworthy 
2.4277286 
62 
Imagine a thermometer from 0 to 100. 
Ratings between 50° and 100° mean that you 
feel favorable and warm toward the person. 
Ratings between 0° and 50° mean that you 
don’t feel favorable toward the person and 
that you don’t care too much for them. You 
would rate the person at the 50° mark if you 
don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward 
them. How would you rate James Scott? 
0-100 52.1721068 
22 
Given what you know, if you had to vote for 
city council right now, how likely would you 
be to vote for James Scott? 
1. Extremely likely 
2. Fairly likely 
3. Slightly likely 
4. Neither likely nor 
unlikely 
5. Slightly unlikely 
6. Fairly unlikely 
7. Extremely unlikely 
4.1700288 
Finally, participants were asked specific demographic questions. This included their 
gender, party id, political ideology, self-gauged political interest, news media consumption, 
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racial or ethnic background, and age. Since the study ran in big cities in California and Ohio, and was 
conducted over the internet, I expected that the sample would lean heavily Democratic and Liberal.  
Table 5: Sample Ideology (Threeway) 
Ideology  n Percent 
Liberal (1-3) 212 61.10% 
Moderate (4, No Answer) 46 13.30% 
Conservative (5-7) 89 25.60% 
 
Table 6: Sample Ideology (Twoway) 
Ideology  n Percent 
Liberal (1-3) 212 70.43% 
Conservative (5-7) 89 29.57% 
 
Table 7: Sample Partisanship 
Partisanship n Percent 
Strong Democrat 121 35.28% 
Not very strong Democrat 52 15.16% 
Lean Democrat 81 23.62% 
Lean Republican 31 9.04% 
Not very strong Republican 28 8.16% 
Strong Republican 30 8.75% 
 
Table 8: Sample Partisanship (Collapsed) 
Partisanship n Percent 
Democrat 175 50.58% 
Independent 113 32.66% 
Republican 58 16.76% 
Key Findings 
 In order to test whether or not disclosure had an impact on voter’s evaluative 
judgement, I was specifically interested in observing participants’ party identification and 
political ideology compared to their respective evaluative criteria. These criteria included how 
competent and trustworthy the candidate was, a feeling thermometer, and vote choice. 
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 In order to do that, I ran a one-way analysis of variance with condition as an 
independent variable and one of these evaluative criteria as my dependent variable. Out of the 
three experimental treatments, adding the liberal cue resulted in a higher score on both the 
competency and trustworthiness scales. However, the control treatment received a higher 
score upon the feeling thermometer and higher likelihood of vote choice. Only vote-choice 
showed any statistical significance.  
Table 9: One Way ANOVA Test Results 
  
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
20. How competent did 
you think that James Scott 
was for the position he 
was running for? 
Between Groups 0.129 2 0.064 0.149 0.862 
Within Groups 144.297 333 0.433     
Total 144.426 335       
21. How trustworthy did 
you think that James Scott 
was for the position he 
was running for? 
Between Groups 0.189 2 0.094 0.259 0.772 
Within Groups 122.790 336 0.365     
Total 122.979 338       
62. Feeling Thermometer 
Between Groups 994.385 2 497.193 1.335 0.265 
Within Groups 124401.633 334 372.460     
Total 125396.018 336       
22. Vote Choice 
Between Groups 17.591 2 8.795 4.603 0.011 
Within Groups 657.377 344 1.911     
Total 674.968 346       
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This led me to conduct a two- way analysis of variance amongst certain variables. 
Specifically, I was curious to see how a participant’s ideology affected their vote choice. The 
two-way ANOVA tests showed that there was a statistically significant interaction between a 
collapsed three-point ideology scale and vote choice. This significance increased (p=.02) when 
simply looking at a “hard” two-point scale (those who answered 1-3 or 5-7 on the ideology 
scale). All groups showed a high vote likelihood when given the control treatment (the non-
ideological cue). However, liberals showed an even greater vote likelihood (albeit slight) for 
voting for the candidate associated with the non-ideological cue than the one with a liberal cue. 
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Table 10: Two-way ANOVA Test Results 
Dependent Variable:  
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 52.106a 8 6.513 3.524 0.001 
Intercept 4067.790 1 4067.790 2200.983 0.000 
splitsample 8.431 2 4.215 2.281 0.104 
IdeologyX3 4.029 2 2.015 1.090 0.337 
splitsample * IdeologyX3 29.006 4 7.252 3.924 0.004 
Error 622.833 337 1.848     
Total 6693.000 346       
Corrected Total 674.939 345       
a. R Squared = .077 (Adjusted R Squared = .055) 
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Discussion 
Since before even the American revolution, campaign finance reform has been a 
controversial topic. Despite the issue sometimes being framed as a modern day liberal crusade, 
the polarized American public appears to show a strong consensus on the fact that there is too 
much money in politics today. Yet since Citizens United, the avenues that many reformers have 
pursued have been either impractical (such as passing an Amendment to the Constitution) or in 
jeopardy of being ruled unconstitutional (such as strict state level systems of matching funds). 
However, the one avenue that the Supreme Court left the door open for was for Congress to 
passing strong disclosure laws.  
To assess the impact that disclosure has upon voters, I ran a survey-experiment of 
registered voters in Irvine, CA and Columbus, OH. I find that disclosure does have an immediate 
impact upon the voting intentions of respondents. Liberals are much more likely to vote for a 
candidate when it is revealed that a commercial is paid for by a nondescript liberal 
organization, compared to when the commercial is paid for by a conservative organization. 
Similarly, conservatives showed the opposite results. It should be noted that vote-choice was 
the only statistically significant result. Broadly speaking, it may be that the second reminder of 
who paid for the advertisement was the key way that disclosure could have an impact; that for 
disclosure to truly remind a voter of his or her own ideological interest, it must be repeated 
multiple times. This would suggest that the subsequent reminder is what is key in making an 
impact in swaying voters. 
What was surprising was the results of the control, non-ideological organization 
(“Americans for Action”). Overall, the control organization fared higher upon vote-likelihood 
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compared to the other organizations. Even more interestingly, the control group actually scored 
slightly higher on vote likelihood for liberals than the liberal interest group. What is likely 
happening here goes back to the idea of projection. For example, when conservatives who 
received the control treatment heard that James Scott would “bring back accountability to 
public schools”, they would project their own interpretation of what that could mean 
(increased school choice, funding charter schools, etc.). Similarly, when liberals heared that 
same phrase, they would project their own interpretation of what policy proposals this would 
translate to (strengthening teachers unions, increasing teachers salaries, etc.) 
While this study does shed light upon the impacts of disclosure, I would be interested in 
changing the methodology in the future. For one, developing a representative sample was an 
issue. Of the 347 respondents, over 61% identified themselves as a liberal. It would be 
important to test this study in multiple other areas where there is a greater share of 
conservatives, and see if the findings differ. Furthermore, it is likely that the sample was highly 
motivated. Requests to take the survey were sent out to over 40,000 email records, yet only 
347 participants provided usable data. Thus, it is likely that this sample was one that was highly 
motivated and one that had prior political knowledge and interest. It would be interesting to 
replicate this study, but to either add a monetary incentive to boost sample response, or to 
recruit via phone or an Interactive Voice Response. It could be possible to receive a more 
representative sample by recruiting via more ‘traditional’ methods, which may appeal to older 
people. By developing a more representative sample, I may also be able to test the impact of 
disclosure upon “high information” vs “low information” voters, or amongst voters who have 
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voted in all 4 of the last 4 elections vs voters who have only voted in 2 out of the last 4 
elections.  
Additionally, it would be interesting to see if having no disclosure information makes a 
difference in vote choice and other evaluative criteria. This would allow us to see the difference 
in the actual impact of having the information compared to not having the information. 
Similarly, I would be interested in testing the validity of this experiment by comparing it to one 
in which disclosure was more “realistic”. In this “realistic” experiment, I would briefly have the 
disclosure information flash upon the screen in small print, similar to how political 
advertisements emulate disclosure now.  
Overall, the policy implications from this study suggest that Congress should pass 
stronger disclosure laws. Although prior research suggests that voters can make “rational” vote 
choices simply based upon various cues, comprehensive and accessible disclosure only appears 
to strengthen these rational and informed vote choices. Making disclosure mandatory on the 
part of politicians, and more accessible for voters can only create a richer and more 
participatory democracy, similar to the one that Justice Kennedy envisioned in Citizens United.  
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Appendix 
Survey Questionnaire 
Thank you very much for participating in this survey. You will watch a short video and then answer a few 
questions about it. You will also be asked a few general questions about your political outlook.  
The Ohio State University Consent to Participate in Research 
Researcher: Farhad Choksy   
This is a consent form for research participation.  It contains important information about this 
study and what to expect if you decide to participate. 
Your participation is voluntary. 
Please consider the information carefully. Feel free to ask questions before making your 
decision whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate, you will be asked to sign 
this form and will receive a copy of the form. 
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explore how voters approach analyzing different kinds 
of political advertisements. 
Procedures/Tasks: You will be asked to watch a 30-second political commercial. You will then 
be asked some questions concerning your thoughts about the commercial. You will also be 
asked some questions about your general political outlook.  
Duration: 
You may leave the study at any time.  If you decide to stop participating in the study, there will 
be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  
Your decision will not affect your future relationship with The Ohio State University. 
Risks and Benefits: 
There are no direct benefits to you. There is a small chance that information transmitted over 
the Internet might be viewed by a third party. We will do everything we can to minimize this 
risk.  
 
Confidentiality: 
Efforts will be made to keep your study-related information confidential.  However, there may be 
circumstances where this information must be released.  For example, personal information 
regarding your participation in this study may be disclosed if required by state law.  Also, your 
records may be reviewed by the following groups (as applicable to the research): 
 Office for Human Research Protections or other federal, state, or international regulatory 
agencies; 
 The Ohio State University Institutional Review Board or Office of Responsible Research 
Practices; 
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 The sponsor, if any, or agency (including the Food and Drug Administration for FDA-
regulated research) supporting the study. 
 
Participant Rights: 
You may refuse to participate in this study without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
otherwise entitled. If you are a student or employee at Ohio State, your decision will not affect 
your grades or employment status. 
If you choose to participate in the study, you may discontinue participation at any time without 
penalty or loss of benefits.  By signing this form, you do not give up any personal legal rights 
you may have as a participant in this study. 
An Institutional Review Board responsible for human subjects research at The Ohio State 
University reviewed this research project and found it to be acceptable, according to applicable 
state and federal regulations and University policies designed to protect the rights and welfare 
of participants in research. 
Contacts and Questions: 
For questions, concerns, or complaints about the study, or you feel you have been harmed as a 
result of study participation, you may contact Farhad Choksy (choksy.2@osu.edu).  
For questions about your rights as a participant in this study or to discuss other study-related 
concerns or complaints with someone who is not part of the research team, you may contact 
Ms. Sandra Meadows in the Office of Responsible Research Practices at 1-800-678-6251. 
If you do not wish to participate in this study, please simply close this browser window. If you 
do wish to participate, please click on the “Continue” button below.  
 
Q1 Are you registered to vote? 
 Yes 
 No 
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey 
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Q55 Autoplay test video  
 
Q54 What is this video of? 
 A dog sledding 
 A person eating 
 A stream of water 
 I could see but not hear the video 
 Don't know/ Didn't Play 
 
If “A stream of water” is Not Selected, Then Skip to End of Survey 
Randomly Sort Groups into “Liberal”, “Conservative”, and “Control” Treatments. 
 
Q3 For this next part, you will be asked a series of questions about politics and current events. Each 
question will be shown for 15 seconds, before automatically moving on. Please select the answer that 
you think is true. 
Q5 Who is the current Speaker of the House? 
 John Boehner 
 Paul Ryan 
 Nancy Pelosi 
 Dennis Hastert 
 Newt Gingrich 
 
Q7 According to the Constitution, how many Senators are allocated to each state? 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 
Q9 Which political party -- the Democratic or Republican -- currently has the most members in the U.S. 
House of Representatives? 
 Democratic 
 Republican 
 
Q11 Which of these parties in the United States is typically considered to be more Conservative? 
 Democratic 
 Republican 
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Q13 How many years are in a US Senator's term? (Open Ended Text Box) 
Q15 Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not? 
 The Supreme Court 
 The United States Congress 
 President of the United States 
 
Q16 You will now watch a 45 second political commercial of a fictional political candidate running for 
City Council.  
Q74 Autoplay Campaign Commercial. 
 
If “Conservative” treatment was selected before, show question 50. 
If “Liberal” treatment was selected before, show question 51. 
If “Control” treatment was selected before, show question 52. 
 
Q50 The advertisement you just saw was paid for by an organization known as Americans for 
Conservative Action. 
Q51 The advertisement you just saw was paid for by an organization known as Americans for Liberal 
Action. 
Q52 The advertisement you just saw was paid for by an organization known as Americans for Action. 
Q19 What was one thing you noticed about James Scott? (Open Ended Text Box) 
 
Q20 How competent did you think that James Scott was for the position he was running for? 
 Extremely competent 
 Fairly competent 
 Not very competent 
 Not at all competent 
 
Q21 How trustworthy did you feel that James Scott was? 
 Extremely trustworthy 
 Fairly trustworthy 
 Not very trustworthy 
 Not at all trustworthy 
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Q62 Imagine a thermometer from 0 to 100. Ratings between 50° and 100° mean that you feel favorable 
and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0° and 50° mean that you don’t feel favorable toward 
the person and that you don’t care too much for them. You would rate the person at the 50° mark if you 
don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward them 
How would you rate James Scott?   
 
If “Conservative” treatment was selected before, show question 63. 
Q63 What group sponsored the ad you just saw?  
 Americans for Conservative Action 
 United for a Better America 
 Affirm Our Future 
 Bring Back Free Markets 
 Revive Liberty 
 
If “Americans for Conservative Action” is selected for Q63, show question 68. 
Else, show Q69. 
Q68 You are correct! The ad was sponsored by Americans for Conservative Action. 
Q69 The ad was sponsored by Americans for Conservative Action. 
 
If “Liberal” treatment was selected before, show question 66. 
Q66 What group sponsored the ad you just saw? 
 Americans for Liberal Action 
 United for a Better America 
 Affirm Our Future 
 Bring Back Free Markets 
 Revive Liberty 
If “Americans for Liberal Action” is selected for Q66, show question 70. 
Else, show Q71. 
Q70 You are correct! The ad was sponsored by Americans for Liberal Action. 
Q71 The ad was sponsored by Americans for Liberal Action. 
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If “Control” treatment was selected before, show question 67. 
Q67 What group sponsored the ad you just saw? 
 Americans for Action 
 United for a Better America 
 Affirm Our Future 
 Bring Back Free Markets 
 Revive Liberty 
 
If “Americans for Action” is selected for Q67, show question 72. 
Else, show Q73. 
Q72 You are correct! The ad was sponsored by Americans for Action. 
Q73 The ad was sponsored by Americans for Action. 
 
Q22 Given what you know, if you had to vote for city council right now, how likely would you be to vote 
for James Scott? 
 Extremely likely 
 Fairly likely 
 Slightly likely 
 Neither likely nor unlikely 
 Slightly unlikely 
 Fairly unlikely 
 Extremely unlikely 
 
Q23 The following questions are for statistical purposes. 
Q24 What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 Transgender 
Display This Question: 
If What is your gender? Transgender Is Selected 
Q25 Is there a specific gender identity that you use to describe yourself? 
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Q26 In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or independent? 
 Democrat 
 Republican 
 Independent 
 
Display This Question: 
If In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or independent? Democrat Is 
Selected 
Q27 Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? 
 Strong Democrat 
 not very strong Democrat 
 
Display This Question: 
If In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or independent? Republican Is 
Selected 
Q28 Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? 
 Strong Republican 
 not very strong Republican 
 
Display This Question: 
If In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or independent? Independent 
Is Selected 
Q29  As of today, do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party 
 Lean Republican 
 Lean Democrat 
 
Q30 Imagine an ideological scale that runs from 1 to 7 where 1 means very liberal and 7 means very 
conservative. Where would you place yourself on that scale? 
______   
 
Q49 How interested would you say you are in politics? 
 Very interested 
 Fairly interested 
 Hardly interested 
 Not at all interested 
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Q50 Typically, how often do you consume news media? News can refer to national, international, 
regional/local news and other topical events accessed via any platform (e.g., radio, TV, newspaper or 
online). 
 More than 10 times a day 
 Between 5-10 times a day 
 Between 2-4 times a day 
 Once a day 
 4-6 days a week 
 2-3 days a week 
 Once a week 
 Less often than once a week 
 Less often than once a month 
 Never 
 
Q31 What do you consider to be your racial or ethnic background? 
 White/Caucasian 
 Black/African-American 
 Hispanic/Latino 
 Asian 
 Bi-Racial/Multi- Racial 
 Other (Please Specify) ____________________ 
 
Q32 How old are you? 
 18-25 
 26-34 
 35-54 
 55-64 
 65 or over 
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